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The Usefulness of the Law
in Obtaining Union Democracy
CLYDE W. SUMMERS*
How E rEcTiVE can the law be in protecting the
union members' basic democratic rights of partici-
pation, due process, accountability, ,and equal
protection? The law at present gives only halting
protection to these rights. Legal relief comes
erratically, giving too little, too late, and costing
too much. This compels a closer scrutiny of these
weaknesses to determine whether they are in-
herent or subject to correction.
Legal Protection of Members' Rights
The first and most critical weakness is that open
recognition of these rights is blocked b' thread-
bare legal doctrines which equate labor unions
with sewing circles. Union members, it is mechan-
ically repeated, have only those rights provided
by the union constitution; and constitutional
clauses which prohibit distribution of circulars,
organizing groups within the union, and creating
dissension or causing disruption, are notoriously
common. Few courts frankly repudiate oppres-
sive use of these clauses, but use elastic contract
logic to covertly protect individual rights. The
veil of doctrine and legal logic conceals the results.
Democracy draws little strength from such de-
viousness, for the myth that a union is a voluntary
association is perpetuated in the minds of union
members and leaders, and even in the minds of
unperceptive lawyers and judges
The law need not be so obtuse. These basic
democratic rights are capable of explicit recogni-
tion and statement as legal principles. They are
the rights of a union member as a citiLen in his
industrial government and can be broadly stated
-as a bill of rights for union members. Like any
bill of rights, they are not self-defining absolutes
but are qualified by the union's right to survive.
Their application to specific fact situations is ex-
ceedingly difficult, and the wavering boundary
lines must be pricked out case by case. Simplicity
and certainty cannot be achieved, but explicit
declaration of these rights will clear away clouds
of doubt and confusion. Problems can be faced
squarely and legal remedies made more effective.
The second major weakness of the law is its
delay. The main stumbling block is the well-
thumbed rule that courts will not intervene until
all appeals within the union are exhausted. This
rule is solidly based, for unions should have first
opportunity and responsibility to correct their
mistakes. However, the protracted process of
appealing through the hierarchy of officials, end-
ing with the union convention, may take years.
Dissenters will have been silenced, opposition
groups disintegrated, corruptly elected officials en-
trenched in power, and union treasuries plundered.
The judges, inwardly aware of the dangers of such
delay, have created multiple exceptions which
allow easy circumvention whenever necessary.
However, constant repetition of the rule dis-
courages the union member, misleads the lawyers,
and frequently trips the harried judge who does not
see the paths of avoidance.
This barrier need not be so high or so deceptive.
Two changes in the law could enable it to fulfill its
constructive purpose and reduce its destructive
consequences. A simple statutory rule could
require exhaustion of all appeals available within
the union in a short period of time, perhaps 6
months. Unions thus could correct themselves
and would be encouraged to provide prompt
internal appeals. In addition, the law could, in
appropriate cases, protect the rights of members
by giving interim relief until those appeals were
exhausted. Such measureswould not only pro-
tect against the dangers of delay but would also
reduce if not eliminate the need for debilitating
exceptions.
The third weakness of legal remedies is the high
cost of litigation. A simple expulsion case may
cost several thousand dollars in transcripts,
printing charges, and lawyers' fees. The very
prospect of such financial burdens discourages
members from asserting their rights, and lawyers
are reluctant to take such cases knowing that they
will receive little or no pay. Those in power,
with the whole union treasury to draw on, can
extend litigation and multiply legal costs until
those who protest are financially crushed.
Two devices could be used to give some help.
When individuals are forced to seek legal protec-
tion for democratic rights, they might well be
considered as protecting rights belonging to all
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members equally. If their claims are upheld,
they should be entitled to full repayment of all
legal costs incurred in protecting these rights.
This is no more than minority stockholders or
beneficiaries of trusts are now given when they
assert rights held in common. The other method
is to place enforcement of democratic rights in
an administrative agency which then carries the
burden of investigation and prosecution. This
would give to the rights of union citizenship the
same aid as has been given to the right to join
unions for 20 years under the National Labor
Relations Act.
None of these three weaknesses which now
hobble the courts in protecting democratic rights
is wholly incurable. Significant strengthening
could be gained by relatively simple changes. The
inquiry, however, cannot end here, for the goal is
not legal victories or judicial proclamations but
more effective democratic rights. These rights,
particularly in the one-party system characteristic
of unions, are primarily instruments of protest.
The ultimate test is whether the law helps or
hinders dissenters in making effective protest
against existing policies or established leaders.
Encouraging Democratic Institutional Practices
Using the law to' strengthen the working ele-
ments of active self-government, which make
union democracy a practicing reality, poses much
more difficult problems. These elements cannot
be framed as legal commands, for they grow out
of institutional structures and mechanisms within
the union organization. The law cannot decree
that the union create open channels of communica-
tions, provide leadership training, or eliminate its
monolithic bureaucracy. These must be achieved,
if at all, by indirection. Furthermore, these
working elements are the sum total of an intricate
network of devices and practices which may exist
in an infinite variety of combinations.
The most stubborn problem is the oligarchic
structure which provides those in power with a
powerful political machine composec of subordi-
nate officers, staff members, and field representa-
tives, none of whom dare to question established
policies or entrenched leadership. Legal recogni-
tion of the right of union employees to organize
might possibly provide political independence to
these secondary leaders. Instead of dutifully
echoing the official line, they might stimulate
debate on critical issues, provide channels of com-
munication, and give leadership to a more vital
functioning democracy.
The law can potentially strengthen the focal
point of union democracy by protecting local
unions from total domination by the international
union. The law cannot decree local autonomy,
for centralized power, particularly in collective
bargaining, is largely compelled by economic
necessity.
Conclusion-
The primary responsibility for strengthening
union democracy lies not on the law but on the
labor movement. On union leaders rests the duty
to develop the institutional mechanisms and
practices which can give life and meaning to the'
forms of democracy. On union members rests
the obligation to assert their rights of citizenship
and to exercise their instruments of self-govern-
ment. The law ought not remove from the labor
movement its responsibility to keep its own house
in order but should only reinforce the efforts of
those forces within who work to achieve th~sd5
ideals.
The law could not decree union democracy, for
apathetic members cannot be compelled to action,
nor can indifference be transformed to interest.
The most that the law can do is to safeguard the
basic rights essential for the life of union democ-
racy, and to contribute where possible to en-
couraging those institutions.which give it vitality.
The law has fallen far short of this limited goal
primarily because it has not explicitly recognized
it as a goal.
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